The year is 1951. A group of medical students forms the National Student Internship Committee to recommend modifications in an internship-matching program proposed by the National Interassociation Committee on Internships (NICI) of the Association of American Medical Colleges. They suggest changes in the algorithm used to conduct the process. These are adopted by the NICI, and the internship match, later to become the residency match, is born.
The students and the NICI were responding to what they perceived as an increasingly intolerable process by which students were offered postgraduate training positions. With no organized system governing appointments, students found themselves pressured to select internships well before their last year of medical school. As hospitals offered positions earlier and earlier in an attempt to preempt the competition for the best candidates, students were confronted with "exploding offers," so-called because they expired if not accepted by the applicant within a day or two. Students often accepted a less desirable position because they had not heard from an institution that they preferred. Hospitals protested that they were merely defending themselves from applicants who cancelled interviews at the last minute or failed to notify them when they had accepted a position elsewhere. Attempts to regulate the process by enforcing uniform appointment dates and longer decision periods failed when nervous or unscrupulous institutions broke ranks or refused to sign such agreements.
Both students and hospitals generally hailed the matching process as a major improvement over the prior chaos. It survived a period of instability in the early 1970s, when integrated residency programs began replacing freestanding internships. In response to student criticism, it changed from a "program proposing" to an "applicant proposing" algorithm in 1996. As the match process became the prototypical applicant selection system, many postresidency fellowship programs adopted an identical or similar method to regulate the appointment process.
When I personally sought a postresidency sports medicine fellowship in 1980, I applied to most of the handful of such programs that existed at the time. A decade later, the number of fellowships had grown exponentially, and the appointment process was afflicted with the same problems that internship selection had faced in the early 1950s. In 1992, orthopaedic sports medicine fellowships joined the matching program.
For a few years, the match seemed to go smoothly. Then, a gradual deterioration began. The AOSSM fellowship committee, a body charged with overseeing the educational aspects of fellowship programs headed by Society members, found its agenda monopolized by complaints and debates about the match process. The causes of this decline have been almost as elusive as its cure. Much of the erosion seems to have stemmed from hearsay and rumor, forces that are always inimical to any orderly system.
My personal observations would lead me to speculate that the disintegration of the match occurred in a sequence such as this: Within the original rules, a program is allowed to notify the applicants where they stand in the program's preference list, although programs are prohibited from soliciting a response to such declarations from the applicants. Many fellowship directors, possibly hoping to sway their preferred applicants to rank their programs highly, made such statements to their favorites. These intimations of virtually guaranteed appointments, particularly from large programs with multiple positions, although perfectly legal, had a significant effect on the "market." The supply of available applicants contracted as budget-conscious applicants cancelled interviews after receiving such an assurance from a desired or acceptable program.
Some of the applicants, seeing no reason to keep their future fellowship directors in suspense, may have voluntarily declared their intention to rank a program at the top of their list. Rumors circulated that some programs went a step further and solicited responses from their top applicants, presumably so they could encourage the next tier of candidates if their first choices were inclined to go elsewhere. How much this really occurred is difficult to determine. However, when rumors are rampant, the truth can become almost irrelevant.
Further contributing to the deteriorating atmosphere was a continued growth in the number of fellowship positions. The competition of nonmatch fellowships, which were not subject to the same regulations, probably increased the temptation for programs that were in the match to circumvent its rules. In recent years, when the number of available positions began to exceed the number of available fellows, the anxiety level among fellowship directors rose considerably. Many programs, including the one at my own institution, withdrew from the match. The number of programs in the match, which had peaked in the early years at 67, fell to 30 in 2003. Conversely, it was estimated that 64 fellowship programs were available outside the match. Since the National Resident Matching Program estimates that 80% participation is necessary for a match to function effectively, it is clear that either the current trend needs to be rapidly reversed or the orthopaedic sports medicine fellowship match will quickly disappear. (Some of our readers may be aware that, coincidentally, the residency match program is being challenged in a lawsuit that claims that it constitutes a violation of federal anti-trust laws. Not being conversant in antitrust law, I have no personal position on the lawsuit and will leave its merits to be thrashed out by our legal colleagues.)
Most lay criticism of the match has essentially stated that it is an inefficient process. Without its constraints, programs may interview applicants when they please, offer positions when they please, fill their openings, and get on with the business of educating fellows and caring for patients. Applicants who are offered an acceptable job may take it and get on with their lives, saving both the time and money that would be spent on additional interviews. The problem with this unregulated system is that it quickly spirals out of control into the chaotic situation that existed among medical students applying for internships in 1950: Applicants are pressured to make decisions progressively earlier in their training, while programs ply them with job offers that "explode" after a brief period if not accepted. Although the match system may indeed cause some applicants to interview at more programs and some programs to interview more applicants, this can be a very positive development, allowing applicants to discover programs that they might otherwise have missed and the programs to interview some applicants that they might have passed over. Both the applicants and the fellowship programs optimize their chance of arriving at the best pairing. The effects of gamesmanship, insider-ism, and favoritism are minimized, and the applicants can make relaxed, informed choices at an appropriate point in their residency training.
When I was applying for an orthopaedic residency in 1976, before most orthopaedic programs participated in the match, one of my interviews was with an orthopaedic spine surgeon. During our conversation, he mentioned that he had actually wanted to become a thoracic surgeon. Because thoracic surgery residency positions were very difficult to obtain, he had applied to some orthopaedic surgery programs as well. As it happened, he was offered a position in orthopaedics and decided to accept it, unsure as to whether he would receive an offer in thoracic surgery. The next day he was offered a thoracic surgery residency but turned it down to honor his commitment to the orthopaedic program. He went on to be an orthopaedic spine surgeon and satisfied his interest in thoracic surgery by becoming known for anterior spine stabilizations, performing the trans-thoracic approaches himself. Although things worked out for this distinguished man of great integrity, I wonder whether the system that required him to make such an ethical choice was preferable to the regulated process that a match would have offered.
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